

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO 4 September 1941 1050 S
Arrival 5 September 1941 505 hours

No. 1713 of 4 September 1941. Most urgent! ^U

The attempt of Prince KONOYE to avoid, by a direct message to President ROOSEVELT, a clash with the ABCD Coalition, and possibly the SOVIET Union, resulted from the following situation.

[Even after MATSUOKA's dismissal, The Third KONOYE Cabinet was set to undertake a far-reaching mobilization as a result of the decision of 2 July which was adopted in the presence of The Emperor; by its very nature this mobilization was directed against the SOVIET Union. Accordingly, KONOYE considerably strengthened hardening elements of the new Cabinet, and, to a great extent, placed the responsibility upon The Navy. Thus a cover of the rear to the North was greatly impeded. As reported, the Army Command in recent inquiries has become more reserved as to a clash with the SOVIET Union. It is being argued that the Japanese Army, tied up and weakened in the war against CHINA, was not in a position to start on a winter campaign against the SOVIET Union. In view of the resistance put up by the Russian Army against an army such as the German, the Japanese General Staff does not believe itself capable of achieving a decisive success against RUSSIA before Winter sets in. Moreover, it is probably guided by the thought of NOKOMIAN, still vivid in the memory, notably of the KWANTUNG Army.] The exaggerated conception of Russian strength is partly based on the misleading argument that even in view of the collapse of the UKRAINE front the Soviet Union still disposed of sufficient fighting forces for taking the offensive against PERSIA on the nearby CAUCASUS front.

[In view of this appraisal of the situation, the KWANTUNG Army allegedly pressed for a decision of the Imperial Headquarters. I learned from a usually reliable source that the Imperial Headquarters in the last days came to the decision to postpone action against the SOVIET Union. A new decision was contemplated, to be taken as soon as clear signs of the decomposition of the Far Eastern Army appear or when a great numerical superiority of the Japanese army is established.]

While consequently the Army, for the time being, adopts an attitude of readiness in the North, the activist elements of the Navy have again come to the fore to a greater extent, demanding a Southern advance. As to the plans existing in these circles (occupation of SIAM, ensuing blockade of SINGAPORE, attack on BORNEO, elimination of MANILA) I have already reported. The younger Navy officers corps are entertaining hopes that recent shifts in the Navy Command, notably the fact that activist VIVIANI KONDO, until now Chief of the Navy General Staff, has taken over an important field command and was replaced by Rear-Admiral ITO, likewise an activist, will be beneficial to these plans. Weighty reasons are brought forth by

this group for an early advance in the South. The Navy still has oil stores for two years. The imports from The Netherlands Indies have ceased and there is no hope that they will be resumed. These stores (*4 groups missing*) lies (*handwritten on bottom of page*) must be used up if JAPAN does not wish to submit helplessly to the dictates of Anglo-Saxons. The Navy activists are convinced that the United States will probably resist an attack on BORNEO immediately and will certainly not allow a peaceful Japanese exploitation. Any attempt to divide the United States and England is doomed to failure from the outset. After the outbreak of the German-Russian War the surrounding countries were welded into a psychological unit against isolated JAPAN. The press chief of the Imperial Headquarters, Colonel MABUCHI (cf. LNB No. 212 to 216, 1 September) and Admiral KONDO have expressed themselves to the same effect. The result is that in case Japan must clash with the coalition, she must fight the United States directly. The impossibility of maintaining the present state of tension with the United States psychologically and materially; without reaching a clash, has induced the circles influencing KONOYE to make the primitive attempt of approaching ROOSEVELT directly. I am told by a reliable source that at first KONOYE wanted to carry on the negotiations secretly. When, however, the fact of NOMURA's visit to ROOSEVELT was published by the American press on the very same day, KONOYE hurriedly convoked the Cabinet for an extraordinary meeting and had to admit, whether he liked it or not, that JAPAN had initiated the talks despite American provocations. As I could gather from unanimous opinions during the last days, it has been suggested to the Navy and the other activist circles that the KONOYE message constitutes a last, not even seriously meant step to convince the Japanese people of the impossibility of a peaceful settlement. It is, however, obvious that this is not the intention of the circles surrounding KONOYE, but that, at least for the time being, a modus vivendi is sought with the United States. I am of the opinion that in view of the very real and far-reaching conflicting interests, this attempt to bring about a detente that is not merely temporary, also cannot be successful. The inner political situation has become even more tense during the last weeks, so that the outbreak of a crisis must be reckoned with at any time. As I reported, the Third KONOYE Cabinet did not know how to provide the Japanese people with unequivocal leadership in face of the grave inner political and foreign political questions which are awaiting a solution. The Cabinet rather tends to avoid any decision and to paralyze the activist groups by playing them off against each other. The attempt on the life of HIRANUMA, the demonstrations of nationalist organizations and the resignation of Admiral SUITSUGU, well-known nationalist leader, from the presidency of The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, sponsored by KONOYE, must be regarded as symptoms of crisis. The negotiations with the United States could possibly drag on for some time, but a compromise, which can be had only by maximum concessions on the part of JAPAN, would at once result in grave inner convulsions. This is confirmed to me by all circles which the Embassy is constantly influencing in accordance with telegraphic order of 25 August, No. 1383.

[OTT.]

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[OTT.]

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

EX-801-A
4080A-1 (item 4)

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

電 報 (秘密暗號法)

東京 一九四一年(昭和十六年)九月四日 十時五十分

着 " " " 五日 五時五十分

緊 急

四一年九月四日 一七二三號

松岡ノ解職後モ亦第三次近衛内閣ハ天皇ノ面前ニ於テナサレタル七月二日ノ決定ニヨリ、ソノ性質上ソビエト聯邦ニ對シテ向ケラレテキタ廣汎ナ動員ヲ確定シタ。近衛ハ其レ故ニ新内閣ヲ掌攝スルヤ、保守派ヲ著シク強メ海軍ニ廣汎ナ責任ヲ負ハシメタ。斯クテ北方ヘノ背後ノ遠慮ハ大障害物ニヨリ妨ゲラレタ。

報告シタ如ク最近ノ同合セニ於テ軍ノ指揮モソビエト聯邦トノ争ニ對シテヨリ遠ヘ目ニナツタ。對文戦争ニヨリ拘束サレ、弱体化サレタ日本軍ハソビエト聯邦ニ對シテ冬期戦ヲ行フ余裕ガナイト言セラレテキル。露西亞軍ガ遠征軍ノ如キ軍隊ニ對シテ爲シテキル抵抗ニ鑑ミ、日本參謀本部ハ冬期到來前ニ露西亞ニ對シ恐ラク決定的成功ヲ收メ得ル自信ガナイ。恐ラクハ又特ニ關東軍ニ於テ

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4080A-1 (item 4)
Ex 801-A

4080A-2 ☆

「モニハシ」生々々々想と虫息想と、導かれテ斗ルデアル
露西亞、國力ニ対スル誇大感ハ、一ハ「ウクライナ」戦線ノ崩
潰ニ拘ラス、尚且「ソグエフト」聯邦が近接セル「コーカサス」
戦線ニ於テ「ベルンヤ」ニ対シ攻勢ニ出ル充分ナル戦闘兵力ヲ
振リ回ケト言フ他ヲ誤ラス推論ニ基因レデアル
事態ノ斯ナル觀測ニ鑑ミ関東軍ハ大本營ノ決定ヲ迫ツタ
ニ違ヒテ、通例信ズベキ助カラ、余ハ決、事ヲ開イク
即チ大本營最近「ゴニート」聯邦ニ對スル行動ヲ延期スル
決定ニ到達ニシテ相デアル、極東軍ニ於ケル明瞭ハ崩壞
ノ徴ガ現レルカ或ハ日本軍ノ大ナル數的優勢ガ確立スル
ヤ否ヤ斯クハ決定ガ下サレル事ガ確定サレデアルト。

オット

供 造 書

Cent. Page 1

余、W・P・カミング (W. P. CUMMING)

ハ正ニ宣讀シテ次ノ點項ヲ証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ (合衆國) 獨逸軍政部長ノ一員タルコト、且如上證明セル發給ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ鹵獲取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セルノ柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部接管ヲ命セラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該鹵獲獨逸外務省集綴文書並文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

cert. page - 2 -

四 余ノ此供通牒ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上記ノ
獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫トシテ、幽復セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接複製寫眞ノ謄本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接複製寫眞謄本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、管理ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
査閲閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブリュー・ビー・カミング

(W. B. CUMMING)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 シー・エツテ・ガード

G. E. GARDE

高級副官事務取扱

LT. COLONEL. AGD

ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部